Friday, 20 February 2015

IA Struggling to Avoid Collapse on Multiple Fronts – Mosul OP in Danger of Failing



In our recent article titled “ISIS Launches First Wave of Attacks Against al-Asad Airbase as Kirkuk Heats Up,” we discussed how the Islamic State (IS) had launched their current offensives against Kirkuk and Anbar Province’s al-Asad Airbase to force the IA into reallocating resources and manpower from their planned operation to retake Mosul. As we predicted, the IA has dispatched reinforcements to bolster the beleaguered joint-IA/Shia militia force that’s struggling to hang on in the province. To do that, these reinforcements have been tasked with retaking the town of Khan al-Baghdadi. With only around 3,000 IA troops freed up to conduct offensive operations (which isn’t nearly enough to hold real estate as big as Fallujah, Bayji, Tikrit or Mosul) we see the scenario playing out that was discussed in “GOI Has Big Plans to Retake The Country From ISIS – But Can They Pull it Off???” In that piece, we stated that it would take tens of thousands of troops to secure Ramadi, Fallujah, Tikrit and Mosul – all of which the IA have been tasked with retaking this spring.


Baghdad sends army to recapture Anbar town from ISIS


http://ift.tt/1G6YMXv


ISIS Launches First Wave of Attacks Against al-Asad Airbase as Kirkuk Heats Up


http://ift.tt/1zO03gl


GOI Has Big Plans to Retake The Country From ISIS – But Can They Pull it Off???


http://ift.tt/16O4nWl


Islamic State Seizes Town of Khan al-Baghdadi, Threatens US Marines at Ayn al-Asad


http://ift.tt/17962Wt


anbar cp


Iraqi Security Forces manning a checkpoint on the outskirts of Anbar Province

Source: Reuters


By now most of our readers have already heard about CENTCOM announcing that approximately 20,000 – 25,000 IA troops (about half of the total IA) will be dedicated to retaking Mosul in the APR-MAY timeframe. That’s what they announced, but the truth is a lot of this force will be consisting of KRG Peshmerga, pro-government tribal fighters and Shia militias – basically using the same formula that was used to retake Jalula and Amerli. Mosul is no Jalula or Amerli, which were used to draw out government forces. IS never intended to stand and fight in either location. Mosul is very different in that its a large population center that IS has set up a defense network consisting of tank trenches, tunnels, fighting positions, even heavy weapons and armored assets brought in from Syria. This was discussed in our piece titled “IA Preps to Take Mosul as Kings Rage Continues” (which also lays out what the IS defense of Mosul may look like) in addition to how IS would likely increase their OP-tempo against places like Baghdad, al-Asad Airbase etc. The Obama administration is fully aware of all this too, so don’t believe their statements of being “shocked” when the Mosul operation doesn’t go anywhere near as smoothly its being hyped.


IA Preps to Take Mosul as Kings Rage Continues


http://ift.tt/1Md5eQW


CENTCOM Outlines Battle for Mosul, Doubles Estimate for IS Dead


http://ift.tt/1BuDpR6


Iraq-Kurdish force of 25,000 ‘to retake Mosul from IS’


http://ift.tt/1w2Hz13


Known Terrorists Among the Beneficiaries of US Assistance in Iraq


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Siege of Amerli Finally Broken


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The Siege of Amerli


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Jalula Update as of 24 NOV 14


http://ift.tt/1M90eNt


Joint Counter-Offensive Launched to Drive ISIS From Jalula, Iraq


http://ift.tt/16O4q4r


ISIS mosul


IS has brought in heavy weapons and additional armored assets to reinforce what they confiscated from the IA when it collapsed last summer

Source: ISIS Study Group


The GOI now appears willing to accept the risks involved in reallocating IA personnel dedicated to static defense to bolster the Mosul effort. They’ve already been scrapping what they had from other efforts as seen in the IA decision to have Shia militias take responsibility of locations in Northern Iraq to free up additional personnel for the Mosul effort. However, the reality on the ground has forced the IA to send personnel to reinforce the defenders of al-Asad Airbase which has caused a delay to the plans to clear Bayji (which according to our in-country sources has been pushed to 26 FEB). A particular concern we have with this Mosul plan is the fact that Bayji and the Zaab Triangle (Hawijah especially) both need to be secured prior to the start of the operation. Why? One of the things that IS will likely due is stage attacks targeting the supply lines utilizing the main Mosul to Baghdad route, meaning the entrenched IS presence in the Bayji-area and Zaab Triangle between Kirkuk and Mosul are equally as important. Targeting the supply routes has the very real potential of cutting off the forces participating in the Mosul operation, allowing IS fighters based in Bayji, Tikrit and Hawijah to block any attempt by the GOI to send reinforcements. Those reinforcements would likely come from dipping into IA units tasked with maintaining a static defense posture or requesting more Shia militia personnel to be deployed, neither of which would be a winning proposition.


With the Peshmerga focusing on a defensive posture due to increased attacks in Irbil and Kirkuk, the likelihood of of an offensive to clear out (and hold) the Zaab Triangle is assessed to be LOW. This will also have an effect on how much manpower the Peshmerga will provide to the Mosul effort. Again, this is all reactionary to what is really an IS-initiated shaping-operation to force the coalition to divert much-needed resources away from the Mosul effort. The GOI is aware of this too, but is hoping the gamble will pay off and that the Mosul offensive will still be a success. However, the success of the operation is completely dependent on the level of US air support the assault force receives and the ability of the IA to alleviate the pressure being applied to al-Asad Airbase. Regarding US air support, the Obama administration needs to authorize the military to increase the amount of airstrikes being conducted and without the current restrictive ROE. If that doesn’t happen and the air support for the operation is the same as the bare minimum that’s already being provided, the operation will result in failure. As much as we hope to be wrong on this, the indicators suggest otherwise.


ISIS Attacks Near Erbil, Iraq, Repelled by Peshmerga: Kurds


http://ift.tt/19MxNWJ


An armed Shi'ite volunteer from the Mehdi Army clashes with Islamic State militants outside the city of Tikrit


Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia member engaging IS personnel in the outskirts of Tikrit

Source: Reuters


Other Articles:


ISIS: Regained the Initiative in Northern Iraq


http://ift.tt/1M90cVN


Iraqi Army Facing Heavy Resistance in Anbar: Counter-Offensive Stalls


http://ift.tt/16O4q4y


Shia Militias Sent to Reinforce al-Asad Airbase – IA on Verge of Collapse


http://ift.tt/1M90cVP





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